

The Pendulum of Leadership Change and Challenges of Civil Democracy and Military Rule in Pakistan

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Abstract

Pakistan's history and political system has been characterized and best understood as a pendulum as the leadership swings back and forth between military and civilian rule on one side and feudal and capitalist economies on the other. The challenges of Pakistan's politics have been shaped by the dynamics of civilian-military relations. This study investigates into the history of civil military relationship in Pakistan and dictates the challenges on the balance of leadership between the military leadership and the civilian rule whilst dictating the people's choice of leadership. This study also establishes which faction has more public support and will ride into the consideration of Pakistan's political future in which the newly elected civilian leadership will have to reckon with in order to ensure the future viability of Pakistan as an independent sovereign state. Although the civilian government enjoys considerable autonomy for political and economic management and exercise of state authority, it has to consider the military's sensibilities or idiosyncrasies. The proven escalated economic performance and consistent high growth in GDP during the military rule has provided a major challenge for the current democratic civilian rule to further enhance the Pakistan economic development for the masses that are more interested in a stable and peaceful country rather than which faction rules Pakistan. The challenges for the new democratic leadership after the successful 2013 election from one elected government to another include political instability, widespread corruption and lack of law enforcement which hampers private investment and foreign aid.

Keywords: *leadership, civilian rule, military leadership, democracy, economic development*

Introduction

Throughout history, numerous countries have experienced their military's involvement in the governmental system. Some have evolved into civilian governments whereas others have experienced a vicious cycle of regular military intrusion. Military organizations are shaped by both functional and societal imperatives. Functional imperatives are special characteristics of military organizations driven by their need to be capable of defending the state against external threats, and societal imperatives arise from "the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society" (Huntington, 1957). Pakistan is one country that has witnessed a military presence in its governmental system since its birth. Pakistan's history has been characterized by periods of military rule and political instability. In its nearly sixty-two years since independence, the Pakistani military has had either direct or indirect control of the government. It has had a tremendous influence on the direction that Pakistan has taken. The military played a pivotal role in the independence of Pakistan and has continued its political role ever since. While the military's role permeates throughout the

political system, there have been periods of challenges to this role over the years. The military-led government stated its intention to restructure the political, economic and electoral systems (Salman, 2008). The current instability witnessed today in Pakistan is due to an unbalanced relationship between the civil system and the military establishment. Civilian democracy has been very short lived every single time and the military had to intervene and takeover the reigns due to historical, socio-political and economic reasons than any inherent dislike of democracy in general (Hassan, 2011). What is greatly lacking is a civil-military relationship that allows for the civil institutions to flourish and the military to stand in the background of this civil environment. This issue of military compliance is also central to Michael Desch's *Civilian Control of the Military* (Desch, 2011). He argues that "the best indicator of the state of civilian control is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge. If the military does, there is a problem; if the civilians do, there is not" (Desch, 2011). Governance in Pakistan is a delicate balancing act between the military chiefs and the elected civilian government (Huntington, 2006). It is a power-sharing arrangement whereby the military has important influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues, and mediates confrontations among feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions if such confrontations are deemed threatening to political order and stability (Hasan, 1998).

This study makes an analysis on the military leadership and the civilian democracy in Pakistan and dictates the challenges on the balance of leadership between the military and the civilian rule whilst dictating the people's choice of leadership. This will ride into the consideration of Pakistan's political future and the economic challenges which the current civilian leadership will have to reckon with in order to ensure the future viability of Pakistan as an independent sovereign state.

Civil Military Relationship Concepts

Formulation of a structural theory of civil-military relations that makes predictions about the strength of civilian control is based on the degree of internal and external threat faced by a given society (Desch, 1999). It is important to start by acknowledging that the two classic works of American civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (Huntington, 1957) and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (Janowitz, 1960) address both military effectiveness and civilian control. Civil-military relations are an explanatory variable, and that their nature has an important impact on military effectiveness (Huntington, 1957). Janowitz, 1960 also discusses military effectiveness but it is not clear in his discussion that civil-military relations serves as an explanatory variable for his assessment of what would constitute an effective military (Janowitz, 1960). The basic methodological assumption is that it is possible to define an equilibrium called "objective civilian control" that ensures civilian control and maximizes security at the same time (Huntington, 1957). He argues that "In practice, officer ship is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal" (Janowitz, 1998). An officer corps is professional to the extent it exhibits the qualities of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. In addition to enhancing effectiveness, these traits also enhance civilian control because a professional military seeks to distance itself from politics (Huntington, 1957).

Military organizations are shaped by both functional and societal imperatives. Functional imperatives are special characteristics of military organizations driven by their need to be capable of defending the state against external threats, and societal imperatives arise from "the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society" (Feaver, 1996). When attempting to understand the characteristics of a given country's military institutions, thinking about how they

may be affected by these two imperatives is helpful. To the extent that a country's military does not share the attributes of the society as a whole, a useful starting proposition is that these differences are due to what the military believes to be required for success in war. However, it is not true that there is a set of universally valid functional imperatives and those societal imperatives merely weaken military organizations (or has a neutral impact). This is clearly what Huntington is implying when he argues that "the peculiar skill of the military officer is universal in the sense that its essence is not affected by changes in time or location" (Huntington, 1957).

Both civilian control and the military's ability to fulfill its responsibilities in meeting the security needs of the state are much needed.(Morris, 1964). However in contrast to relying on the creation of an apolitical military in order to ensure civilian control is an unrealistic approach (Janowitz, 1998). However even in a comparative context the danger of focusing on coups is that it may cause analysts to miss other important ways in which a military exercises influence over political leaders (Feaver, 1998). Such a focus may cause analysts to understate problems with civilian control. Though a coup constitutes perhaps the strongest dysfunction possible, its likelihood is not the only significant issue or even a significant issue in some civil-military relationships. Shirking occurs when the military either fails to diligently and skillfully do what the civilian asks, or does what the civilian asks in a manner which undercuts the civilian's position of greater authority (Feaver,1998). In other words, shirking occurs when military leaders fail to respect either the functional or the relational goals of their civilian leaders (Feaver, 2003).

Transition of Political Powers in Civilian Democracy and Military Leadership in Pakistan

Many countries of the world have gone through monarchy, military rule and democracy; but the case of Pakistan is unique in that there is a constant power struggle between the military and political leaderships and the presidency has changed hands between the two factions many times. In terms of number of years, the military has dominated most of Pakistan's years since 1947, the year when the country was established. Pakistan has been the center of global political attention in the last decade due to its geo-strategic location and inevitable involvement in the war on terror. The reason why it is important to find what the people of Pakistan want; lies in the fact that in any given region, no democracy or any other type of leadership can survive in the long run if the people of the region are against it(Hasan-Askari, 2000).

A politically and economically stable Pakistan would be beneficial for the law and order situation of the South Asian region, and would also help greatly in the global war on terror(Thathiah, 2006). In order to bring stability, one of the two existing factions, military or political, has to have power and has to be accountable to its people and to the world regarding the responsibilities of leadership. To an observer the current democracy in Pakistan would appear to be in its initial stages after a long military regime, but to a student of history, it would appear as a rehash of what has happened many a times in Pakistan's history, the power changes hands between military and political factions and both blame each other for the country's increasing debt, weakening currency and worsening law and order situation(Mazhar, 2008).

Pakistan has experimented with half a dozen constitutions within the first 25 years of its existence. Frequent coups and military rules ensured that neither the constitution nor the other institutions of governance were allowed to evolve(Husain, 2009).The ability of the civilian government to shape the policies and actions of the still-powerful Pakistani military remains very much in doubt. The first decade was crucial to shaping Pakistan's destiny and was marked by drift

and chaos. Seven different prime ministers and eight different cabinets took oaths of office during this disorderly period, resulting in the superiority of bureaucracy in the decision making, with the tacit support of the Army. Pakistan's political system can best be understood as a pendulum between civilian rule and military rule and broken into eight stages as mentioned by Abidi(1998)as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Stages of Military and Civilian Leadership Power in Pakistan

- The first stage was from 1947-1958 and was characterized by the Parliamentary system with the dominant class interest being the feudal land owners.
- The second stage was from 1958-1968. This was martial law with an American presidential system and saw the rise of the capitalist class.
- The third stage from 1968-1977 saw the end of Martial law (with a presidential and parliamentary system) and the beginning of the Bhutto era and the return of feudalism.
- With the coup by General Zia in 1977, military rule returned and the capitalist class was back in power. The fourth stage had begun and ended with his assassination in 1988.
- The fifth stage was characterized by civilian rule (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shariff) until Pervez Musharraf conducted his own coup in 1999 and began the sixth stage. With the events of 9/11, globalization and the rise of the internet, this phase has seen the return of the capitalist class.
- In 2008 the seventh stage of Pakistan's politics appears to have begun. The military era is about to end and the civilians is back in power.
- In the 2013 election for the first time in Pakistan's volatile 66-year-old history there was a transition from an elected government that completed its term to another elected civilian government.

But why has Pakistan been dominated by the poles of military and civilian power and why the pendulum between these two poles? Noted political scientist and human rights advocate, Dr. C. Inayatullah, in his classic book *State and Democracy in Pakistan* argues that one creates the conditions for the other and military became more independent and powerful controlling national politics, its top brass developed an ideology and a set of perceptions to justify their political role (Inayatullah, 1997). As guardians of the nation, they believe they have the right to rule the nation. Once the civilians come into power, feeling threatened by the military, they attempt to control them. As well, with their feudal roots, a pattern of patronage and corruption sets in. The army has repeatedly shown that it will not bow to civilians on national security, refusing a government order, for instance, to play the top spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, under government control (Guardian, 2009).

The poorest, most underdeveloped states with low incomes are the most susceptible to political instability and coups (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007).

This is because "low income makes it more likely that plot turns into attempts, and that attempts turn into successful coups" (Roberts, Russ, 2008).

More importantly, that a coup *trap* exists for these poor states (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007). According to this argument, low income and poor economic performance increase the risk of coups d'état, which keep income and growth that low (or negative) rates and therefore increase the chances of future coups d'état (Collier, 2008). Pakistan is a developing country that faces problems with high levels of poverty and illiteracy. Since its independence, Pakistan has been a victim of an all too powerful military. The military has played a role in the political system since its inception in 1947. One of the main issues at play in Pakistan is the lack of civil supremacy. For most of its existence, Pakistan has been under direct and indirect rule of the military experiencing four series of coup d'état by the Army from Ayub Khan to General Pervez Musharraf.

The military has ruled Pakistan for most of the country's existence and they have shaped and determined the internal politics, security and economic developments whilst at the same time negotiated its role in the region weakening the civilian leadership to be mere followers. The military has political influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues including mediating confrontations among the feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions which created political instability (Mazhar, 2008). It displaced a lawfully elected civilian government which had come into power on the strength of an overwhelming vote by the Pakistani masses. The military has seldom had to face opposition in coming into power. In fact, it has been invited in by political parties and sections of the public at large.

The Pakistani military has played an influential role in mainstream politics throughout Pakistan's history, with military presidents ruling from 1958 to, 1977 to 1988 and from 1999 to 2008. Muhammad Ayub Khan was the first military ruler of Pakistan, serving as the President of Pakistan. As a result of his having control of the Pakistan Army, Ayub deposed his mentor President Iskander Mirza in a bloodless military coup triggering a succession of military takeovers in Pakistan history. Ironically it has been the history of Pakistan that Pakistani Army Chiefs have never relinquished power voluntarily. They have been pushed out of power by another Pakistani General or assassination engineered from within the ranks of Pakistan's Armed Forces. The military-led government stated its intention to restructure the political, economic and electoral systems. General Musharraf is the fourth in a line of army chiefs who seized power on essentially the same pretext, getting rid of dishonest politicians, saving the economy from bankruptcy, and preserving the security and integrity of the country. Coups have been walk-over's. With

compromise rather than confrontation defining Pakistan's political culture and tradition, and with willing partners to be found by different dispensations of ideology packaged by military generals, it is not surprising that the military has ruled Pakistan for thirty two of its sixty years. Perhaps it is not the military which is to blame for Pakistan's repeated military governments, but those of us who have invited it in and let it come and stay in power. The problem with attempting to explain coups or coup preconditions, or any other political phenomenon in the developing world, is that there are often an almost infinite number of causal factors and variables in play (Huntington, 2006). Some explanatory or necessary conditions with the list of the common factors and variables used to specifically explain the occurrence of coups in Pakistan is put forth by authors to explain Pakistan's coups are listed in Table 1 (Ibrahim, 2009).

Theory/Explanation	Source
Benevolent modernization	Huntington (2006, 203)
Civil society penetration	Hussain (2003a, 28), Kukreja (2003, 72)
Combat civilian corruption	Arif (2001, 342), Ferguson (1987, 44)
Communist ideology	Zaheer (1998, 29), Jalal (1990, 119)
Counter-revolution against proletariat	Ali (2000, 10)
Ethnicity	Gregory (1981, 65), Cohen (1986, 316)
External insecurity	Wilcox (1972, 35)
Foreign policy	Zaheer (1998, 28)
Ideology	Cohen (1984, 105), Burki (1991b, 7)
Institutional interests	Aziz (2008, 59)
Islamic subculture in military	Cohen (1986, 319)
Loss of government legitimacy	Arif (2001, 342), Kapur (1991, 128)
Military was dishonoured	Jones (2002, 34)
Maintenance of power	Kukreja (2003, 33)
Path dependency	Aziz (2008, 59)
Personal power	Kamal (2001, 21)
Politicization of officers	Hussain (2003b, 18)
Stabilize economic and political chaos	Wilcox (1963, 210)
Undermined autonomy	Kukreja (2003, 37)
Underperforming government	Zaheer (1998, 29)
Unviable political mechanisms	Kukreja (2003, viii)

Table 1: Prominent Theories of Pakistani Coups d'Etat (Source: Ibrahim, 2009)

Pakistan succession of military and civilian rule has emphasized on Pitirim Sorokin's theory which states that events and stages of society and history are generally repeating themselves in cycles (Sorokin, 1957). Such a theory does not necessarily imply there cannot be any social progress. Following this theory of social change each system overreaches, becomes more corrupt, focuses on its own survival or makes long term decisions that may prove unpopular in domestic politics (peace in Kashmir, dismantling of extremist Islam), and then the other group comes in. Most commonly, the leader of the party or coalition with the most votes becomes the Prime

Minister. This is related to the issue of military compliance which is central to Michael Desch's book "*Civilian Control of the Military*" (Desch, 1999). Desch's theory focuses on civilian control of the military. He says that civilian control is easiest when threats are high and mostly international, hardest when they are primarily domestic. When neither kind predominates, the story is mixed and other factors such as military doctrine may strongly influence civilian control of the military.

Civilian Democracy and Military Leadership in Pakistan

The position of president in Pakistan which is the head of state has traditionally been one of a figurehead, with actual powers lying with the Prime Minister. However, at various times in history, often related with military coups and the subsequent return of civilian governments, changes in the Constitution have altered the powers and privileges associated with the office of the president. In 1986 the power-hungry Zia ul-Haq, the sixth President of Pakistan, brought in the eighth amendment to the constitution. It allows the president to hire or fire prime ministers, governors of provinces, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, judges of the Supreme Court. The current constitution gives the President reserved powers subject to Supreme Court approval or veto to dissolve the National Assembly, triggering new elections, and thereby to dismiss the Prime Minister. The President also chairs the National Security Council and appoints the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Martial law has been declared three times in Pakistan.

A weak economy has a major positive impact on the probability of a coup d'état with low income and poor economic performances increases the risk of further coup d'état, which keep income and growth at low rates and therefore increase the chances of future (Huntington, 2006). Pakistan is the typical example of this situation in which the military leadership hopes to change the situation as they felt the current civilian government is not pushing the economic growth and the rampant disturbances by external and internal threats. In other words, the risk of the military launching a coup in Pakistan is high if the military perceives a threat to its institutional interests, a threat to the nation's external security or domestic integrity or perceives the civilian government to be illegitimate, encroaching on military prerogatives or governing poorly (Ibrahim, 2009). In the late 1990s, the government of Nawaz Sharif improved the provision of key services to the population by bringing in the Army to help run everything from education to the distribution of water and power. So even before the coup of 1999 in which General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif, the Army had taken over large parts of the state by invitation. The provocation for the Pakistan Army's military coup was that the dismissal of General Musharraf as Pakistan Army Chief, the second in a row by the Nawaz Sharif Government. Since Musharraf stepped down in August 2008, the high command of the Army under General Ashfaq Kayani (Chief of the Army Staff) has repeatedly stated its desire to keep out of politics and government. The civil-military "problematique" is the challenge of reconciling "a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do" (Feaver, 2003). The generals have also been well aware how a long period in government makes any ruler in Pakistan unpopular, because for the reasons set out above, no government, civilian or military, can ever give the population most of what it wants or needs. Pakistan gives a picture of a nation far more internally divided than it was under civilian rule (Veena, 2003).

The military governments which took power promising to sweep away the political elites and their corruption also found themselves governing through them, partly because no military regime has been strong enough to govern for long without parliament. Pakistan's only effective

modern institution, because of the repeated failures of Pakistan's civilian governments, because of the security threats that Pakistan faces, and because of the ambitions of the generals, the Army is repeatedly drawn into the business of running other parts of the state. In what could be characterized as different civil-military dynamics, the extent to which civilian policy makers agree about the domestic role of the military will shape whether or not international considerations will drive their military policy (Kier, 1997). Even when the Army is not actually running the state as a whole, it is often involved in matters far beyond its constitutional mandate of defending the country. From the past military and civilian autonomy in Pakistan there is a strong possibility that military rule will prevail in the future based upon the theory about cycles of leadership in Pakistan (Sorokin, 1957). The masses of Pakistan need the military as the internal threats of terrorism particularly al Qaeda and Taliban fighters alongside the border conflict with India at Kashmir. The Pakistan Army has always been associated with the thrust force in keeping the mainstream security in close governance. The masses will look into the military if the current civilian rule moves into the shadows of their former leaders in corruption, tightening the feudal family clan and other related activities which will hamper future foreign investors to enhance the current economic situation (Ibrahim, 2009). The military's primary and official role is to serve as the protector of Pakistan's national and sovereignty. At present Pakistan Armed Forces are the final political authority and the guardian of its own economic interests. A governing civilian regime must work to establish an unquestioned dominance over the Armed Forces and therefore reduce the political and economic power (Huntington, 2006). The generals have also been well aware how a long period in government makes any ruler in Pakistan unpopular, because for the reasons set out above, no government, civilian or military, can ever give the population most of what it wants or needs. The overall involvement of Pakistan's military in the ruling of this state is due to the masses requirement as the civilian rule has been infected with corruption, autocracy and mismanagement (Hassan, 2011). Unfortunately the military rule has also been plagued with the same disease and the end of Musharraf's era will hopefully see the civilian power under President Nawaz Shariff bring peace and harmony between both parties for the future of Pakistan's people (Ashraf, 2013)

Economic Performance during the Democratic Civilian Rule and Military Leadership

At the defense leadership level, Pakistani civil-military relations are shaped by several institutional and constitutional features, which have been highlighted by political practice through the years. The Chief of Army Staff, rather than the Defense Minister or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), is the most powerful position in the defense arena (Cloughley, 2006). This is in large part a reflection of the disproportionate size, seniority and prestige of the Army among the three services (Cheema, 2006). The role of the military also changed in the Zia era compared to when it was first in power under General Ayub in the 1960s. Earlier, the military had played primarily an administrative role, but under Zia it became more and more visible in the economic sector as well (Ravi, 2006). Many lucrative positions in the huge public sector were made available to retired and serving military personnel and it became far easier for private companies to curry favour and make economic progress if they had close ties with members of the military establishment. From the Zia period right up to today, the personal wealth of a very large number of military personnel has grown in a way that could not have originated from their official salaries. For instance the National Logistics Cell is the country's biggest public sector transport organization based on a hybrid civil-military management but its main four divisions are headed by active-duty Brigadier Generals and its operations are Army managed (Siddiq, 2007). Hundreds of army

personnel have posts in civilian institutions whereby civilian officials have long complained about military officers taking up senior posts in the civil service, universities and ministries. Many critics has questioned about the commitment of the Pakistan Army which should be focus into their core business of national security rather than involving in business opportunities whereby the rate of corruption seems inevitable.

Pakistani economy grew at a fairly impressive rate of 6 % per year through the first four decades of the nation's existence. In spite of rapid population growth during this period, per capita incomes doubled, inflation remained low and poverty declined from 46% down to 18% by late 1980s, according to eminent Pakistani economist (Husain, 2009). This healthy economic performance was maintained through several wars and successive civilian and military governments in 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s until the decade of 1990s, now appropriately remembered as the lost decade. **Figure 2** shows Pakistan’s population socio economic status showing the lower middle class and desperately poor at the highest at 65 million people respectively.




Figure 2: Socio Economic Status of Pakistan (Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2012)

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Pakistan expanded 3.59 % in the fiscal year 2012-13 from the previous year. GDP Annual Growth Rate in Pakistan is reported by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2012). Pakistan GDP Growth Rate averaged 4.94 % from 1952 until 2013, reaching an all-time high of 10.22% in June of 1954 and a record low of -1.80 % in June of 1952 as shown in Figure3.



Figure 3: Pakistan GDP Growth Rate from 2004 and Expected GDP until 2014 (Source: Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2012))

Pakistan is one of the poorest and least developed countries in Asia. Pakistan has a growing semi-industrialized economy that relies on manufacturing, agriculture and remittances. Although since 2005 the GDP has been growing an average 5 % a year, it is not enough to keep up with fast population growth. To make things even worse, political instability, widespread corruption and lack of law enforcement hamper private investment and foreign aid. The question of the effectiveness of a democratic system or a military rule in Pakistan has raised its head once again. In terms of macroeconomic performance, the country has fared considerably better during military rule. Economic growth during military regimes averaged 6.1% compared to four per cent during civilian regimes (Ibrahim, 2009). Just to comprehend the quantum of this seemingly small difference, the flood of 2010 that affected two-thirds of the country's districts, is estimated to have affected GDP growth by two percentage points. Although all three sectors of the economy agriculture, industry and services performed better during military regimes, the industrial sector has been the biggest beneficiary of the military muscle and has recorded twice as much growth compared to that achieved under civilian rule. Similarly, the current account balance has historically been healthier during military regimes (Akhbar, 2012). The effect of the stronger macroeconomic performance during military regimes did, in fact, translate into something more meaningful for ordinary citizens. The average level of inflation during civilian rule has been almost double that under military rule. However, the percentage of population living below the poverty line did not differ significantly.

Pakistan's economy has experienced decades of boom and bust in a set pattern. If we divide Pakistan's political history into periods of military rule and democratic rule, we clearly see that the country invariably enjoyed economic boom during the so-called military regimes. A comparison of economic GDP for 60 years between the democratic rule and military leadership in Figure 4 show the military periods of rule have a higher average GDP compared to their civilian counterparts. The bust pattern invariably pertains to the period when Pakistan was ruled by democratic forces. However, the economy, even during the military rule was run by civilian economists. The military rulers appointed the best and internationally acknowledged economic wizards to manage the economy.




Figure 4: Average Pakistan GDP Growth during Military and Civilian Rule (Source: Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2012)).

Current Challenges in the Democratic Leadership

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been ruled by the military for the majority of its existence. Civilian politics in Pakistan in the last few decades has been tarnished by corruption, inefficiency and confrontations between various institutions. Alternating periods of civilian and military rule have not helped to establish stability. Even now, with a civilian government, the military is a major player, retaining apparent veto power over the nation's foreign and defense policies as well as control of its nuclear weapons. The military is assisted by Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy, particularly its intelligence and security forces. For decades, the military had been indisputably the most powerful force in the country. It was far more than an institution that could defend the country. The armed forces interfered with politics and had installed the country's leader for half of Pakistan's history. They controlled large areas of the economy influenced most important decisions made in the country. In addition, the current government has decided that only it and the opposition have a say in the creation of any transition government that has to be created under the constitution if a government collapses prior to an election. The military, which until now has had a say on this issue, no longer does.

Pakistan has just concluded its general elections in 2013, a historic event because this marks the first transition from an elected government that completed its term to another elected government. This is the first time in Pakistan's volatile 66-year-old history a democratic

dispensation will replace another. A two time Prime Minister has been voted in for a third tenure with a considerable majority. The Peoples Party that led the last coalition government remains in the game but with a vastly reduced presence with most of its leaders voted out on the basis of their five year performance. The overall elections 2013 indicated a political maturity that augers well for sustainable democracy in Pakistan. The victory by Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Party (PML-N) is still a genuine win. The success of the media's role in bringing forth Pakistanis to vote was shown through the over-60 per cent reported turn out, rising from a measly 44 % in 2008. Pakistan's elections this time were held in the backdrop of a failing economy, debilitating power cuts, widespread corruption at the highest levels, militancy within, and the unpopular partnership with the United States over the 'war on terrorism' Ashraf (2013). The election results show that voters were clearly fed up with the PPP's corruption and poor economic management. The country has suffered from serious electricity cuts and an anemic economy. It is burdened by a rapid population growth rate, fuelled by poor levels of general and especially female literacy. Pakistan's regional and security relationships are also challenging. Sharif campaigned on the basis of lessening Pakistani dependence on the United States. Sharif may well temper his supposed resentment to the United States. He will likely be encouraged to do so by the Pakistani military. He has no love for the military and was ousted in 1999 by then Chief of Staff Pervez Musharraf and sent in to exile (Ali, 2000). But he will have little choice but to work with them given their importance. In foreign policy Sharif faces immediate challenges. Finding a balance in relations with India is an urgent task, where Sharif will need to increase the momentum set by the previous government. Amongst the challenges Sharif faces are his relations with the military whereby earlier in power these relations soured to a point of his ouster by Musharraf in 1999. This will be tested when the military's interests over vital elements of foreign and security policy are reconciled with civilian control.

Conclusion

Pakistan thus swings back and forth between military and civilian rule one side and feudal and capitalist economies on the other. This paper has been able to identify that although the civilian government enjoys considerable autonomy for political and economic management and exercise of state authority, it is expected to consider the military's sensibilities. The military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can and will influence the nature and direction of political change without necessarily assuming power. Civilian governments have come and gone with bewildering rapidity, whether overthrown by military coups or stranded by the constantly shifting loyalty of their political supporters. It can be shown that the people of Pakistan wants a stable country and with basic supportive requirements for them such as medical facilities, schools etc and this lies in the fact that in any given region, no democracy or any other type of leadership can survive in the long run if the people of the region are against it. From this study it is proven, that for the people of Pakistan it does matter who rules the state whether military or civilian rule although at one time military rule was more acceptable due to the weak civilian rule. Although democracy is the way forward for the country, it needs an agreement on basic framework for economic and social management. The proven escalated economic performance and consistent high growth in GDP during the military rule has provided a major challenge for the current democratic civilian rule to further enhance the Pakistan economic development for the masses that are more interested in a stable and peaceful country and doesn't care which faction rules Pakistan. The 2013 elections show that the first transition from an elected government that completed its term to another elected government. The recommendations for and subsequent challenges for Pakistan for President Nawaz

Sharif's is to reinstate include political stability, address widespread corruption and increase of law enforcement which will hamper private investment and foreign aid in the long run. These recommendations include Pakistan's regional and security relationships and internal relationship with the military which will be tested when the military's interests over vital elements of foreign and security policy are reconciled with civilian control.

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